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BLOOD TESTS AND DISPUTED PARENTAGEt
By LOWEUL R. BowEN*
In a day when science is such an integral part of every-
day life, it is only natural that the courts should come to
depend more and more on the tools for ascertaining truth
which it provides. Of these tools, one of the most accurate
and most useful is the blood test to prove non-paternity,
a test of special significance because it introduces objective
determinations of fact into an area of human relations
where men are particularly susceptible to being governed
by emotion rather than reason and logic.
DEVELOPMENT Or THE TESTs
It has long been assumed that similarity of physical
characteristics between a child and an alleged parent is
evidence of paternity,' and the scientific basis for this as-
sumption was laid in the late 19th century by an Austrian
monk, Gregor Johann Mendel, whose work laid the foun-
dation for the modern science of genetics.2 By the laws of
genetics, in the absence of mutation, 3 an offspring cannot
have any characteristic not present in either alleged parent;
if the child possesses such a characteristic at least one of
t This article is based on a paper originally prepared for Professor L,
Whiting Farinholt's Seminar on Medico-Legal Problems at the University
of Maryland School of Law.
* Of the Baltimore City Bar; A. B., University of Maryland, 1952;
LL.B., University of Maryland, School of Law, 1957.
'For an early American case, see Gilmanton v. Ham, 38 N. H. 108, 113
(1859):
"... we think, under the well established physiological law that
like begets like, and that generally there is a resemblance, more or less
strong and striking, between the parent and his child, it was a fair
matter of argument before the jury by the counsel on both sides,
whether or not there had been anything in the complexion, appearance,
and features of the child which the witness had produced and identified
before them, tending to indicate its other parent."
2 Mendel's report of his experiments has been translated as "Experiments
in Plant Hybridization", Harvard University Press (1948). Though his
report was published in 1866, the value of his work was not generally
recognized until 1900.
8 "Theoretically, mutations [in blood groups] could give rise to ex-
ceptions to the theory once in about 50,000 to 100,000 cases. However,
this rare possibility does not interfere with the medicolegal application
of the tests, because when blood grouping tests are accurately per-
formed there is hardly any other evidence that can approach in relia-
bility the conclusions based on such blood tests."
Medicolegal Application of Blood Grouping Test8, 149 J. A. M. A. 699, 702(1952). There has been only one definitely established case - the Hasel-
horst Case reported by Lauer and Haselborst in 1928. A woman of group
AZB blood had a child of group 0 blood. However, the child had other
abnormalities including idiocy and congenital malformations. ANDREE5IN,
THE HUMAN BLOOD Gnoups (1952) 45.
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them is not in fact his parent. There are two complicating
factors, however, which make general physical appearance
unreliable. First, certain genes, the unit by which physical
characteristics are inherited, are dominant over others, de-
termining the offspring's observable characteristics or
phenotype, while others are recessive, determining the
genotype. The characteristic determined by a recessive
gene does not appear in an individual having the dominant
gene but may be transmitted to and appear in an offspring
receiving a recessive gene from the other parent. Second,
many physical characteristics are determined by more than
one pair of genes, many do not develop until some years
after birth, and many are influenced by environmental
conditions.4
"A character that is to give unequivocal evidence
concerning parentage must be simply inherited, and
its mode of inheritance must be known with certainty;
it must be adequately developed at birth or soon there-
after; it must retain its character throughout life, un-
obscured by climate, disease, age or by any other en-
vironmental or genetical agency. If the character is to
be used to settle a dispute it must be objective."5
Such a characteristic was discovered by Karl Land-
steiner in 1900. Using samples from laboratory technicians,
Landsteiner discovered that human blood can be divided
into three, later increased to four, groups, which are now
identified by the letters A, B, AB, and 0. A few years
later, Epstein and Ottenberg suggested that these groups
were inherited, and this was proved by Dungern and
Hirzfield in 1910, the exact method being determined
by Bernstein in 1924 and 1925.6 This was only the begin-
ning; today more than thirty different groups have been
identified in human blood.'
Identification of blood groups is made possible by the
fact that the red blood cells possess certain substances,
'RAr, AWD SANGER, BLOOD GROUPS IN MAN (2d ed. 1954) 9:
"A main difficulty in studying inheritance in man is the shortage of
normal physiological characters which are inherited in a sufficiently
simple way for us to follow. Practically all normal characters are
complex in their inheritance and depend on many genes, all of which,
individually, behave in a simple Mendelian manner but which, acting
together, obscure their individual tracks."
"Ibid, 310.
"WizEN, RH-HR BLOOD TYPEs (1954) 10. Landsteiner was subsequently
awarded the Nobel Prize in Medicine in 1930.
7Medicolegal Applications of Blood Grouping Tests - A Tentative Sup-
plementary Report, 161 J. A. M. A. 233 (1956).
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agglutinogens, present on the surface of the cells and de-
termined by the laws of heredity, which, in the presence
of other substances called agglutinins, cause the cells to
stick together in clumps, i.e., agglutinate.' Thus group A
cells are agglutinated by the presence of anti-A agglutinin
and B cells are agglutinated by anti-B. Group AB cells are
agglutinated by both anti-A and anti-B and group 0 cells
by neither. Certain agglutinins occur naturally, e.g., anti-B
is a natural constituent of the serum of group A blood and
vice versa. Others do not, and for these groups the testing
serums must be produced artificially by injecting blood of
a known type into another individual or certain animals
which produce the agglutinin in reaction to the presence
of the foreign cells.'
ACCEPTANCE By THE CouRTs
While the science of serology has grown rapidly in the
half century since Landsteiner's original discovery, the
acceptance of blood test evidence by the courts has lagged
behind the development of scientific technique. The ques-
tion of ordering such tests was presented for the first time
to an American court of last resort in the South Dakota
case of State v. Damm.1 ° The defendant's minor foster
daughter had given birth to a child, and he was tried and
convicted of second degree rape. His motion for new trial
was denied, and he appealed, alleging as error, inter alia,
the refusal by the court of his request to have the parties
submit to a blood test. The Supreme Court of South
Dakota held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion
in refusing the request. The court based its holding upon
the proposition that the record did not sufficiently show
that medical science had agreed on the transmissibility of
blood groups to the extent that an exclusion based on them
could be accepted as a positively established scientific fact.
"In other words, we think it insufficiently appears
that the validity of the proposed test meets with such
generally accepted recognition as a scientific fact among
medical men as to say that it constituted an abuse of
discretion for a court of justice to refuse to take cog-
2Supra, n. 6, ps. 2, 3. "An agglutinogen may be defined as a substance
present on the surface of the red blood cells that is Identified by certain
agglutination reactions with diagnostic reagents." Medicolegal Applications
of Blood Grouping Teat8 - A Tentative Supplementary Report (ibid).
9E.g., the Rh groups are named after the Rhesus monkey the blood of
which, injected Into rabbits, was used to produce the first Rh testing serums.
Supra, n. 6, ps. 14, 15.
'62 S. D. 123, 252 N. W. 7, 104 A. L. R. 430 (1933).
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nizance thereof, as would undoubtedly be the case if a
court today should refuse to take cognizance of the
accepted scientific fact that the finger prints of no two
individuals are in all respects identical."'"
On rehearing on this particular point three years later,
the court declared that it had not said that blood tests (by
which was meant the A-B-O and M-N systems) were un-
reliable, but that:
"... it is our considered opinion that the reliability
of the blood test is definitely, and indeed unanimously,
established as a matter of expert scientific opinion en-
tertained by authorities in the field, and we think the
time has undoubtedly arrived when the results of such
tests, made by competent persons and properly offered
in evidence, should be deemed admissible in a court
of justice whenever paternity is in issue. 2
Having thus taken the subject in hand, the court proceeded
to analyze the constitutionality of an order that such tests
be made. It noted that New York and Wisconsin had en-
acted statutes authorizing blood tests and concluded that a
court order for such a test was both constitutional and
within the inherent power of the court without enabling
legislation.
"We perceive no valid reason why courts of record
may not require of any person within their jurisdic-
tion the furnishing of a few drops of blood for test
purposes when, in the opinion of the court, so to do
will or may materially assist in administering justice
in a pending matter.' 18
In spite of the court's concessions to scientific progress,
the judgment was reaffirmed on the ground that at the
time of the trial (1931) the state of the science was not so
far advanced and that the application for testing was not
timely.
General acceptance of the tests as admissible evidence
followed, either by court initiative or legislative enact-
ment, until in 1945 the Maryland Court of Appeals could
say with authority:
"Blood tests are now accepted everywhere, scien-
tifically, as accurate, and the courts and legislatures
1 Ibid, 12.
'State v. Damm, 84 S. D. 309, 266 N. W. 667, 668, 104 A. L. R. 441 (1938).
Ibid, 670.
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have generally followed the same view. The trial
courts in this State have so accepted them for a number
of years, and the Legislature in 1941, by Chapter 307
of the Acts of that year, specifically provided that such
tests could be used in bastardy proceedings. 'M 4
However, the equally vital question of the weight to be
given to blood test evidence has not been settled in Mary-
land, and the results in some of the jurisdictions which
have passed on the question are, to say the least, unfortu-
nate.
BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS
Perhaps the most important legal use of blood tests in
Maryland is in actions under the Bastardy and Fornication
Statute, which provides that whenever the defendant in a
bastardy proceeding denies that he is the father he may
petition the court to order the mother, child, and himself
to submit to blood tests.' 5 The results of the tests are to
be received in evidence, but only if definite exclusion is
established. The statute requires that the tests be made at
laboratories located in Maryland and selected by the judges
of the county circuit courts and the criminal courts of
Baltimore City. The present procedure in Baltimore City
is for the State's Attorney to refer the parties, the mother,
child, and putative father, to the University of Maryland
Hospital Serological Laboratory. Appointments are made
for all three at the same hour to simplify identification,
since the prosecutrix can identify the defendant and pre-
vent the sending of a substitute. Exceptions are of course
necessary when one of the parties cannot be present. In
such a case, the sample is taken by a local physician or
technician, properly marked for identification, and for-
" Shanks v. State, 185 Md. 437, 440, 45 A. 2d 85 (1945). Shanks was con-
victed of rape and appealed, alleging that evidence of blood tests made on
stains on his clothing and at the scene of the crime and on samples of the
blood of the victim and of a girl with whom he alleged to have fought
was improperly admitted. The results indicated that the blood on his
clothing could have been that of the victim but could not have been that
of the girl as he claimed. The Court of Appeals held the evidence admis-
sible and stated at page 439:
"Scientific tests of human blood are now almost universally used
in appropriate cases and the results are accepted as evidence where
they are found to be admissible for the purpose offered in a particular
legal proceeding."
The statute cited in the principal quotation is now 1 Md. Code (1957),
Art. 12, Sec. 20.
151 Md. Code (1957), Art. 12, §20.
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warded with an affidavit of the person taking it. Samples
of five cubic centimeters are taken by venipuncture from
the adults and a few drops by finger or heel puncture from
the infant, both being simple and relatively painless
operations.
The actual group determinations are performed in the
Baltimore Rh Laboratory, a semi-public health institute
sponsored by the Medical, Obstetrical and Gynecological
Society of Maryland. Tests are made for the A-B-O, M-N,
and eight Rh groups. The laboratory is also equipped to
test for Kell, Duffy, and S, but these are not currently
recommended for legal work and are not used.' Two sep-
arate series of tests are run on each sample, and if exclu-
sion is shown, the results are rechecked. A letter is then
prepared reporting and analyzing the results, stating
whether or not there is exclusion, and forwarded to the
State's Attorney.
The Maryland statute provides that the reports "shall
be accepted as prima facie evidence of the results of such
tests," and that when the results are admitted in evidence,
"... the laboratory technicians who made them shall be
subject to cross examination by both parties."' 7 In prac-
tice, however, they are seldom called, the custom appar-
ently being for the prosecution to stipulate that if the
technician had been called he would have testified to the
performance of the tests and to the results obtained. This
is probably the wisest procedure as a matter of trial tactics,
since the testimony of the technician would undoubtedly
add to the weight of the evidence in the minds of the court
or jury. As pointed out above, the statute specifically pro-
IOMedloolegal Application of Blood Grouping Tests, 149 J. A. M. A. 699
(1952); Same. A Tentative Supplementary Report, 161 J. A. M. A. 233
(1956); ANDRESEN, THE HUMAN BLOOD GRoUPs (1952). Exclusion based on
the Rh groups alone was held in the absence of contradictory evidence suffi-
cient to require a finding of non-paternity in Saks v. Saks, 189 Misc. 667, 71
N. Y. S. 2d 797 (1947). For tables of exclusion see Wiener and Wexler,
EBclusion of Parentage by Rh-Hr Blood Test8, 3 Jour. of Forensic Medi-
cine 67 (1956). In regard to the S group, it has been held in a New
Hampshire annulment case, GrouIx v. GroulIx, 98 N. H. 481, 103 A. 2d 188
(1954), where exclusion was based on S alone, "... that the blood group-
ing tests in this case were entitled to evidentiary weight even though
they do not have the benefit of the full genetic data that is available in
the more common blood groups such as A-B-O, M-N, and Rh-Hr." The
A-B-O, M-N, and Rh-Hr groups give a better than 50% chance of exclu-
sion, to which all the other newer groups would add only about 5 to 10%.
Weiner, Newer Blood Groups and Their Medicolegal Aspects, 17 Post
Graduate Medicine A34 (1955). For a detailed table of the various
possible matings in the A-B-O groups, see 1 WIGMoRA, EVlDNiCE (3rd ed.,
1940), Sec. 165b.
'
1 Supra, n. 15, §20.
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vides that the results are admissible only where paternity
is excluded.
One obvious weakness of the Maryland statute is that
it does not provide that the tests shall be compulsory upon
the mother and child. The statute says that the court
"shall order" the parties to submit, and if this were the
only provision, the court could presumably enforce the
order like any other by contempt proceedings. However,
the statute also provides that if the prosecutrix refuses to
submit herself or the child, this fact may be commented
upon by the defense, which seems to imply that no fur-
ther sanctions will be used. If the reason for omitting
sanctions from the statute was a desire to avoid any ques-
tion of unconstitutionality, it would appear to be an un-
necessary precaution. There is no question of self-incrimi-
nation of the prosecutrix or her child, and certainly the
judicial power of the state extends to everyone present
within it, unless specially privileged, to compel them to
appear and testify. The taking of a few drops of blood is
no more of an unconstitutional invasion of private rights
than the taking of photographs or finger prints, and is less
messy than the latter.
An alternative method of enforcing compliance would
be to provide for dismissal of the action upon failure of
the prosecutrix to comply with the blood test order. The
objection that this permits a private party to obstruct
justice by defeating a criminal proceeding ignores the pur-
pose and substance of the statute, which, while criminal
in form and procedure, in effect forces the responsible male
to support his illegitimate offspring and so takes the burden
off the state.'8 The question of whether a Maryland court
could, within its inherent power to enforce its orders,
compel the prosecutrix and her child to submit has not been
before the Court of Appeals and if presented might be
upheld despite the statutory inference, but the question
can more properly be settled by the legislature.
The Maryland statute does not indicate what weight
should be given to the results of blood tests when they are
admitted in evidence nor has the Court of Appeals ruled
IIn Fiege v. Boehm, 210 Md. 352, 359, 123 A. 2d 316 (1956), involving a
suit on a contract to support in consideration of a promise to forbear
criminal prosecution, the Court of Appeals said:
"Prosecutions for bastardy are treated in Maryland as criminal
proceedings, but they are actually civil in purpose. ... While the
prime object of the Maryland Bastardy Act is to protect the public
from the burden of maintaining illegitimate children, it is so distinctly
in the interest of the mother that she becomes the beneficiary of it."
19581
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upon the question,9 and the cases from other jurisdictions
are in conflict. Two Maine cases, however, indicate the
probable and certainly the desirable trend. Jordan v.
Davis 0 was a bastardy action under a statute which, like
Maryland's, authorized the tests but assigned no weight to
be given to the results. The court refused to reverse a
jury finding of paternity where there was evidence of
intercourse with the defendant but no other person, even
though the tests excluded the defendant as the father. The
tests were made by a qualified expert, and there was no
mention in the opinion of any evidence tending to impeach
the testing procedure. The court stated:
"We are not disposed to close our minds to conclu-
sions which science tells us are established. Nor do we
propose to lay down as a rule of law that the triers of
fact may reject what science says is true, ..
But they proceeded to hold:
"Believing as we do that the jury could in consider-
ing all the testimony have rejected the accuracy of the
blood grouping tests in this instance, we cannot say
that their findings is [sic] manifestly wrong."22
One year later, in Jordan v. Mace,8 the court was again
faced with the same question. In this case, however, there
was ample affirmative evidence of the care taken in testing
the samples. After reciting the precautions taken, the court
commented:
"What further safeguards could reasonably have
been taken to protect the integrity of the tests? If the
jury may disregard the fact of non-paternity shown
here so clearly by men trained and skilled in science,
the purpose and intent of the Legislature, that the light
of science be brought to bear upon such a case as this,
are given no practical effect.
There is dictum in the Shanks case, supra, n. 14, 449, which indicates
that the Court of Appeals may be inclined to give conclusive weight to
blood tests in paternity cases. The court commented that in bastardy
prosecutions ". . . the non-scientific evidence is often quite unreliable and
scientific evidence may be conclusive as to non-paternity."
0143 Me. 185, 57 A. 2d 209 (1948).
21 Ibid, 210.
2 Ibid, 211. Accord, Pomaineville v. Bicknell, 118 Vt. 328, 109 A. 2d 342
(1954). These cases emphasize the importance of strict security for the
samples and positive proof of careful testing by qualified technicians, par-
ticularly in a case of first impression.
144 Me. 351, 69 A. 2d 670 (1949).
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"Jordan v. Davis, supra, is not authority for the
proposition that a jury may give such weight as it may
desire to biological law. Such a law goes beyond the
opinion of an expert. The jury has the duty to deter-
mine if the conditions existed which made the biologi-
cal law operative. That is to say, were the tests prop-
erly made? If so made, the exclusion of the respondent
as father of one child follows irresistibly. 2 4
The court also observed that if the jury's finding meant
that the tests were inaccurate, it must have been based on
"mere conjecture or understandable sympathy for the com-
plainant and prejudice against the respondent," for it was
unsupported by the evidence in the record.25
It is this "understandable sympathy for the complainant
and prejudice against the respondent" that makes it essen-
tial, to prevent the gross miscarriages of justice typified
by the Davis case, that the results of the tests, when not
attacked for error in the testing procedure or lack of quali-
fication in the expert, be given conclusive effect. Appar-
ently most juries, as in the Davis case, and some judges,
treat sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix as synon-
ymous with procreation of her child, with the deplorable
result that one who is no more the father than they are
is saddled with the child's support.26 The cases reflect a
- Ibid, 672.
0Ibid, 673. To the same effect, Commissioner of Welfare v. Costonie,
277 App. Div. 90, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 804 (1950). In Fowler v. Rizzuto, 121
N. Y. S. 2d 666, 667 (1953) the Court of Special Sessions of New York
summarized the Coetonie decision as holding that ". .. a blood test exclu-
sion is conclusive in a paternity case, unless the integrity or expertness
of the serologist is successfully attacked." Accord, Clark v. Rysedorph,
281 App. Div. 121, 118 N. Y. S. 2d 103 (1952). Note United States v.
Shaughnessy, 115 F. Supp. 302 (S. D. N. Y., 1953), where petitioners,
claiming citizenship through their alleged father, were refused admission
by the immigration authorities on the ground that blood tests proved non-
paternity. The results of the tests were not consistent and were in poor
form. On these facts the District Court held that it was a denial of due
process to deny petitioners opportunity to test the accuracy of the blood
grouping tests by examination into the qualification of the testers and
into the procedures employed.
E.g., Commonwealth v. Hunscik, 182 Pa. Super. 639, 128 A. 2d 169
(1956). The prosecutrix testified that the defendant had intercourse with her
several times including during the period of conception and that she did not
have intercourse with any other man during that period. The defendant
introduced the results of blood tests performed by a well-qualified expert
which excluded him as the father. His motion for a directed verdict was
denied and the jury returned a verdict of guilty. On appeal, the Superior
Court, one judge dissenting, held that since the statute providing for the
tests did not make the tests conclusive, the failure of the trial judge did
not constitute error. The Court then continued (171) :
"... a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice. In this
connection we note that the testimony of the prosecutrix was not en-
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willingness to penalize indirectly the act of fornication
which, regardless of the religious or moral view of the fact
finder as to its propriety, is not a crime in Maryland. The
ancient witticism from the law of negotiable instruments
that if the original maker cannot be found, the subsequent
indorser will be held responsible often becomes a reality.
Until the Court of Appeals or the Legislature gives the
test results conclusive effect, the ridiculous results which
have occasionally occurred in other jurisdictions, such as
the notorious Charlie Chaplin case in California,27 could
happen in Maryland.
ADULTEHINE BASTARDY
While under the Maryland statute blood tests are avail-
able only to the defendant to prove exclusion, there is one
class of cases where such tests may be useful to the prose-
cution: adulterine bastardy. If the prosecutrix was mar-
ried at the time of conception or the time of birth of the
child, the child is presumed to be the legitimate offspring
of the marriage.2" This is one of the oldest, strongest, and
most salutary presumptions of the common law. Where the
child is in fact a bastard, in order for a bastardy proceeding
against the natural father to succeed it is necessary that
this presumption be rebutted, and to do this, clear and
convincing proof is required: generally that the husband
had no access to his wife during the period of conception,
or that he was impotent, both of which are often difficult
to prove. In certain cases, it is possible by blood test evi-
dence to establish that the husband is not the father. The
problem is whether the evidence is admissible and if
tirely satisfactory. This circumstance Is not without significance in
the light of the testimony of appellant's medical witness."
Even 'the accused may be a victim of this reasoning. Sussman and Schatkin,
in Blood Grouping Tests in Undisputed Paternity Proceedings, 164 J. A.
M. A. 249, 250 (1957) point out that In 67 cases where the defendants
failed to contest the proceedings, subsequent tests to which the parties
voluntarily submitted excluded 9% of the accused men as fathers. Since
the tests prove exclusion in only half of the cases In which the defendant
Is not actually the father, a probable 18% of the 67 admitting paternity
were not in fact responsible.
Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P. 2d 442 (1946). Although
the case received notoriety because of the defendant's fame as an actor,
the court was merely following the California Supreme Court's holding In
Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 10 Cal. 2d 428, 74 P. 2d 1043 (1937). The situation
was complicated by a California statute (CAL. CODE Civ. PRoC. (1953)
§1978) which provided that "no evidence Is by law made conclusive or
unanswerable, unless so declared by this code."
18 Clark v. State, 208 Md. 316, 118 A. 2d 366 (1955), noted 16 Md. L.
Rev. 336 (1956). As the note indicates, an exception has sometimes been
made where pregnancy at the time of marriage was concealed from the
husband.
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so whether it is sufficient to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy.
In 1777 Lord Mansfield handed down as an adjunct of
the presumption of legitimacy the rule which bears his
name.29 This rule, while allowing the bastardizing of other-
wise legitimate issue by outside testimony, for some reason
of "decency and morality", forbids the spouses, who should
know most about the matter, to testify to any fact indicat-
ing illegitimacy until non-access has been established by
outside evidence, and then allows them to testify as to any
fact other than non-access. Even if not greatly respected,
the rule appears to be in force in Maryland today. 0 Thus,
if the blood tests are regarded as testimony by the spouses,
and the Lord Mansfield Rule is strictly applied, the evi-
dence might be excluded unless the presumption of legiti-
macy has been rebutted by other evidence. There are two
reasons, however, why the rule should not apply. First,
the tests are not the type of evidence to which the rule
was intended to apply, being objective and not subject to
fabrication by the parties. Second, the testimony is not
that of the parties but that of the expert witness who per-
formed the tests. The latter reason is in line with the
reasoning in Shanks v. State"' which permitted the intro-
duction into evidence in a criminal prosecution of the re-
sults of tests made on blood found on the clothing of the
defendant. In rebuttal to the argument that the defendant
was being forced to give evidence against himself, the
court noted, quoting from an Oklahoma case, that there is
a difference between experiments which the defendant is
compelled to perform in court and those performed out of
court as to which another testifies in court. The court said:
"'The difference is this, * * * that when such com-
parisons and experiments are made outside of Court,
the evidence thereto falls from the lips of witnesses
other than the defendant. The production of such evi-
dence, therefore, and the testimony thereto, is not that
of the defendant, but of other witnesses,...' ,
If this reasoning is applied to blood tests in bastardy pro-
ceedings, the testimony would be clearly admissible under
the Lord Mansfield Rule.
9 Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 91, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777). For a dis-
cussion of the relation of the Lord Mansfield Rule and the presumption
of legitimacy in Maryland, see The "Lord Man8field Rule" and the Pre-
aumption o1 Legitimacy, 16 Md. L. Rev. 336 (1956).
10 Supra, n. 8.
1185 Md. 437, 45 A. 2d 85 (1945).
-Ibd, 444.
1958]
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Assuming blood test evidence to be admissible, it should
be sufficient to rebut the presumption of legitimacy,
whether or not the court gives it conclusive effect, since
Maryland only requires clear and convincing proof.33 A
case from another jurisdiction very closely on point is
State v. Clark, decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio in
1944.1 The prosecutrix had married in 1941 and separated
from her husband in April or May of 1942. In May she in-
stituted divorce proceedings and secured a decree in No-
vember. In January of 1943 she filed a complaint against
Clark and in March gave birth to a full term child, appar-
ently conceived in wedlock. Blood tests performed on the
mother, child, and the ex-husband excluded the possibility
of his paternity, and a proper foundation having been laid,
were admitted into evidence without objection. The trial
judge charged the jury that before a child can be adjudged
that of any other than the husband, the proof must be
" 'clear, certain and conclusive either that the husband
had no powers of procreation, or the circumstances were
such as to render it impossible that he could be the father
of the child.' " The jury found the defendant guilty. On
appeal, an intermediate court reversed, but the Supreme
Court of Ohio reinstated the trial court's judgment, hold-
ing that clear and convincing evidence that there were no
sexual relations between the husband and wife during
the period of conception was sufficient. While the court
did not give conclusive weight to the blood test evidence
and did not have to rule on its admissibility, there having
been no objection at the trial, it did make the following
significant comment:
"In the absence of statutory approval, we see no
good reason why plaintiff in the instant proceeding
should have been denied the right, even had the de-
-In Hale v. State, 175 Md. 319, 321, 2 A. 2d 17 (1938), noted 3 Md. L.
Rev. 79 (1938), an adulterine bastardy case, the Court of Appeals held
that, since the prosecutrix was married at the time of the conception and
birth of the child, the presumption of legitimacy arose, placing upon the
State ". . . the exacting burden to show to the contrary by clear, satis-
factory and convincing evidence ......
"4144 Ohio St. 305, 58 N. E. 2d 773 (1944).
a'Ibid, 774-775. Note also Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N. J. Super. 152, 76
A. 2d 717 (1950), a civil action for support of a child conceived before but
born during marriage. In reply to plaintiff's objection to the tests that
they would not be sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy,
the court simply noted that the presumption is rebuttable. The court
refused to rule on whether the results are conclusive or merely a form
of expert testimony, but cited SCHATKIN, DIsPUTED PATERNITY PaOOEMOINoS
(2nd ed. 1947) 184, for the statement that there is no longer any contro-
versy as to the reliability, dependability even infallibility - of the tests.
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fendant objected, to introduce the testimony as to the
findings and result of the blood-grouping test. She was
charging another than her former husband with the
paternity of her child, conceived while she was still
married, and it was essential as a part of her case to
exclude her former husband as the father. Although
the testimony of the expert who made the blood-group-
ing test was not conclusive as to the non-paternity of
[her former husband], it was admissible for whatever
weight it might be given in establishing that fact." 6
The Maryland Court of Appeals has not yet been called
upon to pass on the question, but it was recently presented
to the Criminal Court of Baltimore in State v. Cook.37 The
court briefly reviewed the background of blood testing and
held that the results of the blood tests on the husband,
wife, and child were admissible and were legally sufficient
proof to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. However,
the Supreme Bench without opinion granted the defen-
dant's motion for new trial, apparently on the question of
the admissibility of the blood test evidence, and the State
declined to prosecute further.
DIVORCE AND ANNULMT
If the blood test evidence is admissible in adulterine
bastardy prosecutions to exclude the husband as father
of the child, it should be admissible for the same reasons in
an action for divorce on grounds of adultery or annulment
on grounds of concealed pregnancy at the time of mar-
riage, and the conclusions on the presumption of legitimacy
and the Lord Mansfield Rule reached above apply here
with equal force. However, there is one new element - the
problem of getting the wife to submit to the tests. This is
not true in the ordinary bastardy proceeding, where the
authority is given by statute, subject to the limitations
discussed above, or in adulterine bastardy, where the wife
comes in voluntarily to prosecute and the husband (usually
then divorced, as in the Cook case) has nothing to lose by
submitting to the tests. However, where a husband seeks
a divorce on grounds of adultery or an annulment on
grounds that he married the woman on the false repre-
sentation that she was with child by him, and the wife
resists the action, she has everything to lose and nothing
-Ibid, 777.
Daily Record, Feb. 21, 1957 (B. I. No. 659/1956).
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to gain by submitting, since the results may prove non-
paternity but cannot prove paternity.
This situation appears to be covered in Maryland by
Rule 420 of the Maryland Rules, effective January 1st, 1957:
"Whenever the mental or physical condition or the
blood relationship of a party or of an agent or a person
in the custody or under the legal control of a party,
is material to any matter involved in any action, the
court may, upon motion by any party and notice to all
other parties, for good cause shown, order such party
to submit to a mental or physical or blood examination
by a physician or physicians or to produce for such
examination his agent or the person in his legal cus-
tody or control."
Since adultery," unlike fornication, is a crime in Mary-
land, this raises the question of whether the results of blood
tests performed upon the wife against her will would, if
admitted in evidence against her, constitute a violation of
the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.39 If Allen v. State ° means,
as it appears to mean, that Maryland draws the line in the
area of experiments between passive (finger-printing, stand-
ing for identification, photographing) and active (trying
on a hat in open court) conduct, the former being per-
missible, certainly there would be no difficulty. Also, if the
case is interpreted as drawing the line between conduct
required upon the witness stand as opposed to acts out of
court to which another testifies, blood tests should be
admissible. Nor, under recent Supreme Court decisions,
is there any danger that compelling the respondent to sub-
mit to such a test would violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantee of due process, so long as the test samples
are taken without brutality or physical violence.4' A court
order to submit under penalty of citation for contempt
would be both effective and constitutional.
"3 Md. Code (1957) Art. 27, §4.
Art. 22 [9 Md. Code (1957) 42].
40183 Md. 603, 39 A. 2d 820 (1944).
"'Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432 (1957). For a discussion of self-
incrimination, search and seizure, and due process in a related area, see
Burgee, A Study of Chemical Test8 for Alcoholic Intowication, 17 Md. Law
Rev. 193, 206-216 (1957). See also, 164 A. L. R. 967 and 25 A. L. R. 2d
1407. Blood tests have been held not to invade the "right" of privacy in
Anthony v. Anthony, 9 N. J. Super. 411, 74 A. 2d 919 (1950) and Cortese
v. Cortese, 10 N. J. Super. 152, 76 A. 2d 717 (1950).
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WErGrr As EVmEcE
In the divorce area as in other applications of blood
tests there is the recurring problem of the weight to be
given to the test results. The recent case of Prochnow v.
Prochnow4 points up both sides of the problem. Joyce ob-
tained a decree of divorce from Robert, and Robert ap-
pealed from that part of the decree which adjudged him to
be the father of her child and ordered him to pay support
money. The evidence showed that Robert entered the
military service in February, 1953; that when he came
home on furlough his wife was notably unappreciative of
his presence; that during his absence she dated a man
named Andy; and that there had been no sexual intercourse
between Joyce and Robert during the possible period of
conception except on one occasion. On that occasion, March
12, 1954, Joyce flew to San Antonio and had intercourse
with Robert on the night of March 13. The next day before
leaving for Milwaukee, she told him that she did not love
him and that she was going to divorce him. Her complaint,
alleging cruel and inhuman treatment, was served on April
8, 1954, and amended September 16 to include an allegation
of pregnancy by Robert and a demand for support. On
November 21 Joyce gave birth to a full term child which
an obstetrician, called by Robert, testified possibly could
have been the product of the March 13 intercourse. Joyce,
of course, denied intercourse with any other man.
Before trial, two blood grouping tests were made of
Robert, Joyce, and the child; the first on March 21, 1955;
the second on September 29, 1955, under court order. The
experts by whom or under whose supervision the tests
were made testified that each test eliminated Robert as a
possible parent.
On appeal the trial judge's finding of parentage was
sustained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, three justices
dissenting. The court admitted that:
"Cynics, among whom on this occasion we must
reluctantly number ourselves, might reasonably con-
clude that Joyce, finding herself pregnant in February
or early March, made a hasty excursion to her hus-
band's bed and an equally abrupt withdrawal when
her mission was accomplished. 4
The court felt, however, that disregarding the blood tests,
the record did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
"274 Wis. 491, 80 N. W. 2d 278 (1957).
ajIbid, 280.
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Robert was not the father. Coming to the tests, the court
noted that the Wisconsin statute only makes the test and
its results admissible in evidence, there to be given such
weight as the trier of fact considers that it deserves.
"The conclusion seems inescapable that the trial
court's finding must stand when the blood-test statute
does not make the result of the test conclusive but
only directs its receipt in evidence there to be weighed,
as other evidence is, by the court or jury."44
The judgment was therefore affirmed, and the court's
bantering description of the situation fails to obscure the
gravity of the injustice of its decision.
The heart of the argument against giving conclusive
weight to the test was summed up in the lines ". . . what-
ever infallibility is accorded to science, scientists and lab-
oratory technicians by whom the tests must be conducted,
interpreted and reported retain the human fallibilities of
other witnesses."45 But as the dissenting opinion observed,
two tests six months apart by different experts in different
laboratories reached the same result, and the correctness
of the procedures and the qualifications and impartiality
of the experts were unchallenged.
Justice Weingert, writing the minority opinion, conceded
that the Wisconsin statute did not make the tests conclu-
sive, but he declared:
"The decision of questions of fact, and determina-
tion of the weight to be given to evidence of various
types, are judicial functions exercised by the courts
from time immemorial. It is the duty of the courts,
as well as their power, to adopt the principles of proof
best calculated to determine such questions correctly.
They should not wait for the legislature to take the
initiative to that end. Courts should not shut their
eyes to advances in science which conclusively estab-
lish a fact, by simply repeating the age-old maxim
that credibility of witnesses is for the trier of fact."4
The minority did not overlook the possibility of human
error in blood testing, saying:
"We would preserve to the party against whose
contentions blood tests operate to the fullest oppor-
tunity to challenge the qualifications of the testers, the
"Ibid, 281.
"Ibid, 280, 281.
Ibid, di8. op. 281, 285.
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propriety of the testing procedures and the correctness
of the report of their result. The plaintiff had such
opportunity here, and failed to discredit the tests or
the testers in the slightest degree.' '4
In conclusion, no better summary of the area can be
found than the prefatory note to the Uniform Act on Blood
Tests to Determine Paternity:
"In paternity proceedings, divorce actions and other
types of cases in which the legitimacy of a child is
in issue, the modern developments of science have
made it possible to determine with certainty in a large
number of cases that one charged with being the father
of a child could not be. ... If the negative fact is estab-
lished it is evident that there is a great miscarriage
of justice to permit juries to hold on the basis of oral
testimony, passion or sympathy, that the person
charged is the father and is responsible for the support
of the child and other incidents of paternity."'48
In Maryland, the law is still relatively undeveloped. It
remains to be seen whether the initiative in that develop-
ment will come from the courts or the legislatures. Cer-
tainly the Cook49 case is not a very promising beginning.
47 Ibid.
"9 U. L. A. (1957) 102.
"Daily Record, Feb. 21, 1957 (B. I. No. 695/1956).
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